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CHINA’S FOREIGN INVESTED PARTNERSHIP 
ENTERPRISE LAW: THE LIFELESS OR SLEEPING 
DRAGON? 
Samuel H. Shaddox† 
Abstract: Investors and the Chinese government tout the March 2010 
authorization of the Foreign Invested Partnership as an exciting new method for foreign 
investment in China.  However, this comment argues that the Foreign Invested 
Partnership is not likely to become a vibrant short or long-term platform for foreign direct 
investment.  The historical trends of China’s three other vehicles for foreign direct 
investment from 1979 to the present provide two key conclusions.  First, foreign 
investors will not utilize Foreign Invested Partnerships until they receive detailed 
implementing regulations from China’s central government.  Second, support or 
restrictions from the Chinese government can drive or inhibit use of an investment 
vehicle.  China’s Foreign Invested Partnership lacks detailed regulations, and is also not 
likely to receive them in the future because of increased involvement with local 
authorities.  Additionally, it is not likely to receive support from the Chinese government 
because of lingering suspicions of the partnership enterprise and an ongoing political 
transition.  Because foreign investors will shy away from this unpredictability, the 
Foreign Invested Partnership is not likely to be widely utilized in the short or long term.  
The author recommends that Foreign Invested Partnership proponents overcome these 
hurdles by pushing for detailed, favorable regulations for equity investment-focused 
Foreign Invested Partnerships.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Partnerships were once commonplace in China.1  In fact, many 
Chinese still refer to friends with full confidence in one another as a 
friendship between Guan and Bao, a reference to a business partnership from 
feudal times.2  During the middle of the twentieth century, partnerships fell 
into complete disfavor with China’s socialized economy and were 
essentially forgotten as a business entity.3  
After slowly easing restrictions on domestic partnerships during the 
last fifteen years,4 China authorized the Foreign Invested Partnership (“FIP”) 
                                                 
† Juris Doctor expected in 2013, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal and note that any errors are solely his 
responsibility.  
1 Fang Liufang, Chinese Partnership, 52(3) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 43–47 (Xia Yuantao, 
Sang Binxue & Danian Zhang trans., 1989).   
2 Id.   
3 Id.   
4 JAMES ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTED 
ENTERPRISES 92–105 (3d ed. 2010). 
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in March of 2010.  Authoritative texts hail FIP as a promising development 
for foreign investors.5  According to the Chinese government, the law was 
designed to “build . . . a friendly environment for foreign companies and 
individuals [for] establishing partnership enterprises in China.”6  
Foreign direct investment has grown remarkably since China opened 
to it in 1979.7  During the 1980s investment in China grew at an annual rate 
of about $1.6 billion USD before accelerating rapidly during the 1990s and 
2000s.8  During the first six months of 2012, China received $59 billion in 
investments, making it the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct 
investment, while the United States, the second largest recipient, received 
$57.4 billion.9   
However, foreign direct investment in China has fallen over the past 
year, a trend that analysts expect will continue at a much greater rate during 
the next year.10  In response to this decline, the Chinese government has 
taken numerous measures to reverse the trend.11  Left undefined is the role 
FIP will play within this recovery. 
The FIP joins three pre-existing foreign direct investment vehicles:  
the equity joint venture (“EJV”), authorized in 1979;12 the wholly foreign-
owned enterprise (“WFOE”), authorized in 1986;13 and the cooperative joint 
venture (“CJV”), authorized in 1988.14  During the past thirty years, the 
percent-share of foreign direct investment between EJV, CJV, and WFOE 
has changed dramatically.15  The recent approval of FIP makes it a natural 
vehicle for China to seek increased amounts of foreign direct investment.  
                                                 
5 Id. at 92–111. 
6  Laney Zhang, China: Rules on Foreign Invested Partnerships, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Dec. 7, 
2009),  http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205401719_text.   
7  See K.C. FUNG, LAWRENCE J. LAU & JOSEPH S. LEE, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 42–47 
(2004) (chronicling the growth of foreign direct investment after 1979). 
8  VAI IO LO & XIAOWEN TIAN, LAW AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE LEGAL AND BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENTS AFTER WTO ACCESSION 100 (2005). 
9  Jack Perkowski, China Leads in Foreign Direct Investment, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/11/05/china-leads-in-foreign-direct-investment. 
10  China Foreign Investment Falls for 11th Time in 12 Months, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-20/china-foreign-direct-investment-falls-for-11th-time-in-12-
months.html. 
11  China to ‘simplify’ procedures for foreign investors, BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20440206. 
12  JUN FU, INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENTS: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA DURING AN 
ERA OF REFORMS 27 (2000). 
13  Id. at 48.  
14  PHILLIP DONALD GRUB & JIAN HAI LIN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 67 (1991). 
15 FU, supra note 12, at 10. 
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However, this comment argues that it is unlikely that a significant 
number of foreign investors will be interested in playing out a modern day 
Guan and Bao through the formation of an FIP.  Part II of this comment 
analyzes China’s foreign direct investment patterns and concludes that FIP 
utilization by foreign investors will depend on authorization by the 
government of detailed implementing regulations.  Additionally, the 
historical trends indicate that FIP will fail if the Chinese government does 
not provide support.  Part III of this comment argues that FIP is unlikely to 
receive detailed implementing regulations, which will limit its adoption with 
foreign investors.  Similarly, China’s historical suspicion of partnerships and 
an ongoing political transition suggest FIP will not receive government 
support.  Part IV concludes that FIP’s best chance of becoming a vibrant 
investment vehicle is through development of detailed implementing 
regulations for a specific category of foreign direct investment:  equity 
investments.   
 
II. THE FIP IS BORN  
 
In 2007, the Chinese government stated that rules regarding FIPs 
would be issued at a future date by the State Council.16  In considering 
authorization of FIP, the government faced an important challenge.  Were 
they to make FIP too advantageous as an investment vehicle, large-scale 
abandonment of the other foreign direct investment vehicles could ensue.17  
But of course, FIP had to include some advantages over other investment 
vehicles or foreign investors would not utilize it.18  
Between 2007, when the Chinese government indicated that rules 
regarding FIP were forthcoming and the 2009 authorization, the government 
considered two potential FIP laws.  The first was created by the Ministry of 
Commerce and was highly restrictive.19  It required central approval for both 
levels of capital investment and all amendments to partnership agreements.20  
The second model, authored by the State Council Legislative Affairs Office, 
                                                 
16 Partnership Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. VI, art. 108 (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020061018643910006
967.pdf.   
17 Wei Cui, Will Partnership Law Be Worth It?, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 30 (2008). 
18 Id. at 31. 
19 Id. at 30. 
20 Id. 
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 2 
 
472
was less restrictive; it did not have any limits on capital structure and did not 
require approval of changes in partnership structure.21 
The law adopted by the government was more restrictive because it 
required an application for and approval of any changes in the partnership 
structure of the firm.22  As one commentator notes, this requirement throws 
the essence of a partnership “out the window” by requiring that the 
government itself be an indispensable partner and giving it the final say in 
any major partnership decision.23 
China tempered this considerable limitation by providing several 
incentives for foreign investors.  First, it did not require an initial capital 
investment or subsequent modification within the FIP regulations beyond the 
general foreign investment enterprise requirement of thirty-thousand RMB.24  
Additionally, other foreign investment enterprises have required registered 
capital, normally $100,000 USD, depending on the business plan, fifteen 
percent of which must be contributed within three months of the business 
license issuance, and the remainder within two years.25  An FIP does not 
have to meet either of these requirements.26  In addition, foreign investors 
have the ability to better control investments with Chinese partners in an FIP 
than in a joint venture.27  
The FIP has several other advantages that foreign investors should 
consider.  First, an FIP, unlike other foreign investment enterprises, is not 
required to publicly announce its formation, provide guarantees to investors, 
or acquire approval from the government when decreasing capital.28  
Second, unlike the other foreign investment enterprises, an FIP is not 
required to make up for accumulated losses or allocate reserve funds from its 
profit until the statutory reserve fund reaches fifty percent of the foreign 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 See Administrative Provisions on the Registration of Foreign Invested Partnership Enterprises 
Decree of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 47, ch. 3, arts. 21–30 (promulgated by 
the State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), translated in 
24(3) CHINA L. & PRAC. 41–42 (Apr. 2010).   
23 Cui, supra note 17, at 30. 
24 See Administrative Provisions on the Registration of Foreign Invested Partnership Enterprises 
Decree of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 47, ch. 2–3 (promulgated by the State 
Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), translated in 24(3) CHINA 
L. & PRAC. 41–42 (Apr. 2010).   
25 China’s Latest Partnership Investment Vehicle for Foreign Investors, SALANS,  
http://www.salans.com/~/media/Assets/Salans/Publications/1006%20Salans%20Foreign%20Invested%20P
artnership%20Enterprise%20Alert%20En.ashx (last visited Dec. 18, 2011). 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28 Id. 
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investment enterprise’s capital.29  Third, unlike CJVs or EJVs, which 
prevent complete foreign control because of their governance structures, 
FIPs may designate its Chinese partners as limited partners, which results in 
greater control for the foreign investor.30  
In addition to its benefits, FIP is also subject to many of the 
limitations common amongst other foreign investment enterprises.  These 
limitations are applied more strictly against FIP.  Like all forms of foreign 
investment enterprise, FIP is governed by the 2012 Foreign Investment 
Industrial Guidance Catalogue (“Catalogue”).31  The Catalogue has three 
different categories:  encouraged, restricted, and prohibited.32  These are 
defined according to industry fields and subcategories within each 
industry.33  The Catalogue is especially limiting regarding FIP, prohibiting 
its use in 1) any industry prohibited to foreigners, 2) any industry which is 
open to only EJVs and CJVs, 3) any industry which is only open to a project 
with either absolute or relative controlling Chinese shareholders, and 4) any 
industry which requires a specific shareholding ratio of foreign investors in a 
project.34  This indicates that the Chinese government intends to more 
severely limit FIP vis-à-vis other vehicles for foreign direct investment.  
Compounding these restrictions is an absence of detailed 
implementing regulations for FIP.  Investors have universally called for the 
development of regulations that will provide foreign investors with an 
understanding of the regulatory treatment of FIP.35  Nevertheless, language 
from a 1990 analysis of the legal framework for foreign investments remains 
accurate concerning the new FIP law and regulations:  the “[l]aws and 
regulations are couched in broad, ambiguous and sometimes conflicting 
terms, leaving local or central implementing agencies a wide scope for 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See Administrative Provisions on the Registration of Foreign Invested Partnership Enterprises 
Decree of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 47 (promulgated by the State Admin. 
for Indus. & Commerce, Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1, 2010) (China), translated in 24(3) CHINA L. & 
PRAC. 41–42 (Apr. 2010); Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended 2011), 
Decree of the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China, No. 57, ch. 1, art. 3 (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 
2007). 
32 Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended 2011), Decree of the State 
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, No. 
57 (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 2007).  
33 Id.  
34 China’s Latest Partnership Investment Vehicle for Foreign Investors, supra note 25, at 5. 
35 Id. at 12; Alan Wang & Chen Yong, Foreign-invested Partnership Regulations: Radical Reform 
or Unmet Expectations?, 24(1) CHINA L. & PRAC. 17 (Feb. 2010). 
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interpretation and leading to inconsistent treatment.”36  Foreign investors 
seek a determinacy that Chinese regulation has consistently refused to give 
FIP. 
The FIP law lacks detailed implementing regulations and appears to 
be restricted by the Chinese government.  In order to determine the 
significance of these two factors, this comment analyzes the impact of vague 
regulations and government support on the other three modes of foreign 
direct investment in China.  
 
III. THE DIFFICULT PATH OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES IN CHINA 
INDICATES TROUBLE FOR FIP 
 
In 1978, China adopted the open door policy that invited substantial 
foreign participation and investment in its economy for the first time since 
the Chinese civil war.37  Over the following thirty years, China implemented 
three principal foreign investment enterprises in an effort to secure foreign 
direct investment, complete with a body of law distinct from existing 
domestic rules.38  The history of these previously enacted foreign investment 
enterprises indicate that FIP will have difficulty becoming a viable direct 
investment platform for western investors.   
The first approved method of foreign direct investment was equity 
joint venture (“EJV”) which was officially authorized on July 8, 1979.39  
Typically, an EJV is a limited liability company established by two or more 
partners in which parties are liable for losses and share profits according to 
their respective equity interest.40  This fixed, inflexible ratio of profit and 
loss sharing between the partners is the defining characteristic of EJV.41 
                                                 
36 Zafar Khan, Patterns of Direct Foreign Investment in China, 120 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION 
PAPERS 27 (1991). 
37  FENG LI & JING LI, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 5 (1999). 
38  WILLIAM B. GAMBLE, INVESTING IN CHINA: LEGAL, FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY RISK 155 
(2002). 
39  Xiaoguang Zhang, Foreign Investment Policy, Contribution and Performance, in FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 11, 13 (Yanrui Wu ed., 1999); LI & LI, supra note 37, at 
54. 
40  See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, Order 
of the President of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 31, 2000, effective Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_
en_info.jsp?docid=51032.  For a detailed description of the Cooperative Joint Venture in China, please 
refer to ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4. 
41  Zhou Ziya, A Comparative Study of Three Kinds of Enterprise Involving Foreign Investment in 
China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 110-11 (William 
Tai ed., China Trade trans., 1988). 
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China next authorized wholly foreign-owned enterprise (“WFOE”) in 
1986.  An WFOE is a limited liability company that is one-hundred percent 
foreign-owned in which a foreign party’s liability is limited to its contributed 
investment.42  Accordingly, the largest advantage of a WFOE is the ability of 
the foreign party to manage and operate the enterprise as desired, without the 
involvement of a Chinese partner.43  The lack of a Chinese partner, however, 
can be a disadvantage because it increases the importance of the foreign 
entity’s familiarity with Chinese culture and business practices.44  
China approved the cooperative joint venture (“CJV”) through formal 
legislation in April of 1988.45  It is also known as the “contractual joint 
venture”46 because the main terms and conditions of cooperation are 
established in the joint venture contract itself.47  Therefore, a CJV, unlike an 
EJV, does not require investment partners to assume risk or share profits 
according to their respective capital contribution.48  Instead, risk and profit 
ratios are established in the initial contract between the parties.49   
 
A. Existing Foreign Investment Enterprises Struggled Initially Because 
of Regulatory Uncertainty  
 
Historic foreign direct investment trends in China indicate that FIP 
needs detailed implementing regulations before foreign investors will widely 
adopt it.  Each of the precursor investment vehicles floundered in the years 
between their adoption and government regulation.  Without the Chinese 
government clearly indicating the limitations of an investment method, 
foreign investors were essentially asked to take on substantial risk and hope 
legal challenges were not forthcoming.  The 1979 approval of EJV 
established a pattern of authorizing laws that speak only in very broad terms 
                                                 
42  ZIMMERMAN, supra note 4, at 85. 
43  GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 72. 
44  HAISHUN SUN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: 1979–1996 51 
(1998). 
45  See PRC, Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law (Promulgated by the Nat. People’s Cong., 
Apr. 13, 1988), translated in 2(4) CHINA L. & PRAC. 41–42 (May 1988). 
46 Lutz-Christian Wolff China’s Private International Investment Law: One-Way Street into PRC 
Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1039, 1042 (2008) (citing Clark T. Randt Jr., Joint Ventures, in DOING BUSINESS 
IN CHINA 1–3, § 2.02 [4]; OWEN D. NEE JR., SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS AND JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA 
65 (2005). 
47 Wolff, supra note 46, at 1042. 
48  YUWA WEI, INVESTING IN CHINA 74–76 (2000). 
49 GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 67. 
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regarding the enterprises they legalize.50  The 1979 act is best viewed as an 
“enabling act, leaving specific details and programs to be worked out either 
in regulations or the joint venture documents.”51  The act was simply a three 
page authorizing statute without any specific provisions, regulations, or 
guidelines for implementation.52  The simple, limited nature of the enabling 
act for EJV contributed to low utilization rates, but implementing regulations 
were not issued until four years later.53  
Similarly, China approved WFOE in April of 1986, but it was again 
merely an authorizing law.54  The lack of implementing regulations placed 
one-hundred percent of WFOE risk creation on the foreign investor, who 
was forced to guess whether an investment would run into legal challenges.55  
Yet, China took two years to issue detailed implementing regulations for 
WFOE.56   
The CJV faced similar regulatory uncertainty.  When it was 
authorized in 1988, its viability was limited, especially for multinational 
companies that, as a matter of practice, required certainty and predictability 
to make large investments.57  Despite the need to ameliorate CJV’s lack of 
certainty and predictability, China’s government did not issue detailed 
regulations until seven years after CJV’s initial approval.58  
The FIP is following a similar pattern to EJV, WFOE, and CJV.  It 
lacks detailed implementing regulations.  This deficiency, similar to those 
investment vehicles, will likely contribute to low utilization rates by foreign 
investors.  
  
                                                 
50  Eileen Golden, People’s Republic of China–1983 Joint Venture Implementing Regulations–The 
Supplement of Detail, In An Attempt to Attract Foreign Investment, 15 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389, 393 
(1985) (noting that the initial approval of the EJV lacked accompanying specific regulations).  
51  William Alford & David Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of China’s 
Emerging Legal Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 56, 71–72 
(1981). 
52  Id. 
53  Crawford Brickley, Equity Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China: The Promised Land 
Not Yet in Sight for Foreign Investors, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 257, 260 (1988). 
54  Z.Y. James Fang & David K.Y. Tang, The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law: Defining the 
Legislative History and Interpreting the Statute, 2 J. CHINESE L. 153, 153 (1988).  
55 GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 80. 
56 See Foreign Direct Investment in China, U.S.–CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, 
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (showing that WFOE 
utilization by foreign investors accelerated after promulgation of implementation regulations).  
57  Editors’ Notes, 9(9) CHINA L. & PRAC. 32, 32 (1995).  
58 KUI HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW 115 (2000). 
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B. Government Support Was a Significant Contributor to the Relative 
Success of EJV, WFOE, and CJV 
 
Government support and regulation of EJV, WFOE, and CJV 
determined the degree to which investors utilize them.  EJV flourished under 
substantial government backing, while both WFOE and CJV were hampered 
by excessive restrictions.  The fate of FIP will similarly be determined by 
the balance between government support and regulation.  
The presence of government support is even more critical when   one 
considers that written laws and regulations often diverge substantially from 
how they are applied.59  A governmental agency can trump any right 
guaranteed to a corporation by the law and the Constitution.60  The 
Communist Party in China drives part of the divergence between written and 
applied laws, creating changes that are frequent and substantial enough to 
effectively repeal existing laws.61  For example, a local government can 
require a corporation to submit a monetary contribution that is expressly 
prohibited by law.62  In this example, the foreign investor would have to 
cope with unexpected costs and might be deterred from continuing the 
investment.  Yet variance from written laws cuts both ways, as government 
agencies often choose not to enforce laws unfriendly to certain forms of 
foreign investment, especially in the case of local governments seeking 
capital.63   
China’s inconsistent treatment of foreign investors is also guided by 
market concerns.  For example, China implemented an austerity program in 
1989 and 1990 that resulted in massive losses for foreign investment firms 
and strong government pressure against certain business practices that the 
government had previously guaranteed as protected.64  The result was that 
many joint venture firms scaled back production considerably.65 
It is clear that the Chinese government can essentially control, through 
its own preferences, the success or failure of a given investment vehicle 
through both official and unofficial means.  Government support was a 
                                                 
59 Anyuan Yuan, Foreign Direct Investment in China–Practical Problems of Complying with 
China’s Company Law and Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 482 
(2000). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 GRUB & LIN, supra note 14, at 91. 
65 Id. at 209.  
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critical factor in the relative historical utilization of EJV, WFOE, and CJV 
by foreign investors.   
 During the first four years following approval of EJV, only eighty-
nine joint ventures were approved.66  This led the Chinese government to 
make significant revisions to EJV in 1983 with the goals of “enabl[ing] the 
existing Chinese-foreign joint ventures to be run more successfully and . . . 
attract[ing] more foreign investors . . . to establish new joint ventures.”67  
Notably, the purpose of these modifications was not to make the economy 
more liberal, but simply to clarify the existing regulations in order to 
encourage greater confidence amongst foreign investors.68  The revised 
regulations provided detailed rules regarding organizational governance, 
registration, capitalization, management, taxation, and labor relations.69   
As a result, foreign firms grew more interested in EJV in China.70  
Approved EJVs spiked to 279 between January 1983 and June 1984, and 
totaled 741 for 1984.71  Yet, by 1986 foreign investment in China had 
dropped precipitously due to widespread recognition of legal difficulties, 
again disappointing both foreign investors and China’s government.72  In 
1990, reacting to foreign investors’ skepticism, China amended the joint 
venture law.73  Most importantly, China eased onerous regulations that 
severely restricted the ability of a foreign investor to control a joint 
venture.74  China also relaxed restrictions on the life span of joint ventures 
and the ability of foreign ventures to swap foreign exchange currencies 
among themselves.75  After these modifications, EJV became the most 
utilized and prominent form of direct investment in China.76  EJV remains 
popular because it has the longest track record (in terms of development and 
interpretation) of any foreign investment enterprise, offering an important 
measure of predictability.77  
                                                 
66  Brickley, supra note 53. 
67  MARGARET PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE CONTROL OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT UNDER SOCIALISM 73 (1991) (quoting Yuan Mu, State Council spokesman 
(1983)). 
68 Id. 
69  See Golden, supra note 50, at 391-401. 
70  LI & LI, supra note 37, at 60. 
71  Id.  
72 Brickley, supra note 53, at 260-62. 
73 Zhang, supra note 39, at 15; Barbara Potter, China’s Equity Joint Venture Law: A Standing 
Invitation to the West for Foreign Investment?, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 1, 27 (1993–94). 
74 Zhang, supra note 39, at 15. 
75 Id. at 15–16.  
76 Khan, supra note 36, at 36 (noting general investment patterns generally). 
77  Clark T. Randt, Jr., Joint Ventures, in 2 DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA II-2.1, § 2.02[2] (Michael J. 
Moser & Fu Yu eds., 2011). 
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Despite its evolution, investors have increasingly turned away from 
EJV and relied more heavily on WFOE for five reasons.  First, many high 
profile joint ventures failed due to partnerships with inefficient and large 
PRC state enterprises.78  Second, cultural differences sometimes resulted in 
the Chinese partner failing to act as expected.79  Third, some foreign 
investors failed to select appropriate Chinese entities and partners for their 
investments.80  Fourth, EJV regulations required technology transfers 
between the foreign entity and Chinese partner, which threatened to 
compromise foreign investors’ trade secrets.81  And finally, over time 
investors grew more comfortable investing without a Chinese partner.82  
Many of the reasons that led investors away from EJV will also deter foreign 
investors from an FIP with a Chinese partner.  
The WFOE, in contrast to EJV, was not initially favored by China 
after it was approved in 1986.83  The Chinese government barred WFOEs 
from certain industries and severely limited domestic sales of WFOE 
products. 84  China did not prefer WFOE because of a direct conflict with the 
socialist principle of public ownership.85  Additionally, unlike joint ventures, 
in a WFOE there is no Chinese partner that benefits from foreign expertise 
and capital.86  
Yet, over time China eased key WFOE restrictions.  Important to the 
deregulation trend were the positive policy changes by the Chinese 
government, including removing unfavorable WFOE-specific tax 
provisions.87  In 2001, additional barriers were removed as part of China’s 
ascension to WTO membership.88  This external pressure helped build even 
further momentum for WFOE.89  WFOE’s share of foreign investment 
enterprises increased from approximately ten percent in the late 1980s, to 
fifty percent by 2000, to almost eighty percent today.90 
                                                 
78 GAMBLE, supra note 38, at 158. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 WANG, supra note 58, at 130. 
82  Randall Peerenboom, Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises, in 2 DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA II-3.2, § 
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In contrast to WFOE’s mounting support, the Chinese government has 
not backed CJV.  CJV was developed by investors as a response to 
restrictions placed by China on EJV.91  Its three comparative advantages 
were 1) no requirement of substantial investment by the Chinese partner, 2) 
flexible profit disbursement that allowed for reinvestment of capital, and 3) 
investment certainty for both the Chinese and foreign investor.92  Prior to the 
1988 approval of CJVs, it was already more popular than EJV:  over five-
thousand similar arrangements had been approved without the official legal 
framework.93   
Following the Chinese government’s initial approval in 1988, 
commentators were optimistic that CJV would become the dominant 
Chinese foreign investment enterprise: 
It has been proved in practice that Chinese-foreign cooperative 
ventures, as compared with Chinese-foreign joint ventures, are 
more flexible, more suitable for the conditions of China, where 
both capital and technology are inadequate, and they embody 
more favourable terms and conditions for foreign investors.  
Therefore, they are readily accepted by Chinese and foreign 
parties and have become the best way to introduce and make 
use of foreign capital in China.94 
Having noted these advantages, Zhang Jielin, author of the above quoted 
passage and then-deputy director of the Institute of Legal Research for the 
Academy of Social Sciences of Guangdong Province, concluded that the 
central government needed to pass laws and regulations necessary to provide 
predictability in order for CJV to become a vibrant foreign investment 
enterprise.95  As noted above, it took Beijing seven years to provide this 
framework.96  Ambiguities in the 1995 Rules were subsequently addressed 
with another regulatory update in October of 1996.97   
Even after the development of detailed regulations, CJV continues to 
decrease in popularity as an investment vehicle, primarily because it lacks a 
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“clear and independent legal form” and receives less favorable policy 
treatment from China–including outright refusal by Beijing to implement 
certain key CJV features.98  For example, the initial regulatory provisions for 
CJVs had more stringent requirements than EJVs.99  The lack of regulatory 
promulgation following CJV authorization was also problematic, causing 
confusion regarding foreign investors’ rights, benefits, and obligations.100  
As a result, CJVs have fallen almost completely out of favor with foreign 
investors; in 2010, only three-hundred of the 27,406 foreign investment 
enterprise projects were CJVs, or just over one percent.101  At their peak 
during the 1980s, CJVs accounted for nearly fifty percent of the foreign 
investment enterprise projects in China.102   
The CJV remains a viable option primarily for those from cultures 
closely related to China, because, lacking a clear and independent legal 
form, it requires comfort and a working familiarity with Chinese culture and 
laws.103  Accordingly, foreign investors from Hong Kong (pre-integration) 
utilized the CJV at a greater rate than investors with greater sociocultural 
differences with China.104 
In reviewing the path of EJV, WFOE, and CJV, it is apparent that 
government support played a critical role in their development.  Government 
support will similarly have a substantial impact on whether FIP is widely 
utilized by foreign investors.  
IV. THE FIP ENTERPRISE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE WIDELY UTILIZED BY 
INVESTORS 
Two pre-eminent scholars, Lieberthal and Oksenberg, found that 
policy-making in China is a highly fragmented process that requires system-
wide active cooperation among bureaucrats.105  This has three important 
implications for the development of sufficiently detailed FIP implementation 
regulations.  First, the need for detailed implementing regulations must be 
pushed to the central government by interested stakeholders (e.g., foreign 
investors and provincial authorities), where high-level political actors can 
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both coordinate a response and bring together interested parties.106  Second, 
any fragmentation of authority requires strenuous efforts to maintain the 
consensus necessary to move forward.107  And finally, any proposed policy 
requires the attention and support of at least one top political leader.108 
The FIP is unlikely to meet the second and third conditions of these 
policymaking requirements.  Additionally, FIP is not likely to receive 
detailed implementing regulations because of its uniquely devolved approval 
process.  Similarly, FIP is not likely to receive government support because 
of lingering resentment of the partnership entity and the ongoing political 
transition in China.   
A. Decentralized Authority for FIP Approval Will Likely Hamper the 
Promulgation of a Detailed Regulatory Platform 
Foreign investment is driven by two basic factors:  the safety of the 
investment and the opportunity for profit.109  China’s lack of regulatory 
clarity has been a constant deterrent to investors, who have called attention 
to it repeatedly, going so far as to call it the “foremost issue” for foreign 
direct investment in China.110  One unique aspect of FIP is its reliance on 
provincial, rather than national authorities for approval.111  Some 
commentators have even suggested that this devolution might be an 
important step towards systemic deregulation of foreign investments.112  
Devolution of FIP approval has some potential benefits for foreign investors, 
but as a whole, will hinder the development of FIP as a viable foreign 
investment enterprise by making the development of detailed implementing 
regulations unlikely.   
It is important to first note the potential benefits of devolved approval 
for FIP.  Central approval from China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(“MOFCOM”)113 for other foreign investment enterprises typically takes 
around three months and can be much longer depending on the proposed 
investment.114  Accordingly, establishment of a foreign investment enterprise 
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other than an FIP is a “time consuming, multi-step, and often expensive 
process involving various government agencies.”115  A devolved approval 
process for FIPs should be much shorter, as the state authority is able to 
register FIPs upon application, and is strongly encouraged to make the 
decision within twenty days for most FIPs.116  However, if necessary, an FIP 
must obtain relevant licenses or permits for specific businesses prior to 
enjoying this accelerated timeline.117 
A streamlined and local approval process also presents a significant 
disadvantage.  Foreign investors will likely struggle to navigate the 
inconsistent practices of many local authorities.118  The devolved process 
will result in decreased predictability and necessitate greater reliance on 
informal discussions at the local level between investors and authorities to 
ensure approval and compliance.119  
Some commentators are highly skeptical that devolved authority will 
lead to new investment opportunities and argue instead that it will increase 
uncertainty by presenting local investment opportunities that conflict with 
existing regimes.120  For example, because minimum capital requirements 
for FIPs are not specified by law, these requirements will likely be 
developed through practice,121 which, developed at the local level, 
introduces more unpredictability for foreign firms that will have to balance 
substantial regional differences.  Elevating provincial authorities in the 
regulatory process is therefore likely to further obfuscate an already opaque 
process while introducing a much more difficult environment for effective 
informal contact by requiring the foreign investors to develop new 
relationships with provincial authorities. 
The devolved FIP approval process is also likely to negatively impact 
the national development of detailed implementing regulations.122  
Decentralization of foreign investment policies can impede development of 
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regulations.  In the late 1970s, decentralization increased the capacity of 
localities to resist the central government’s priorities, leading to conflict.123   
Similarly, in the 1980s, investors had to watch as localities repeatedly 
frustrated the policies of upper level authorities.124  For example, differing 
local preferences were partially to blame for China’s failed national priority 
to procure investment in the energy and transportation fields.125  During this 
time, localities and Special Economic Zones were given authority to approve 
certain joint ventures valued at less than either $10 or $30 million.126  Yet, 
local preferences for profitability led to the approval of projects that clashed 
with national priorities, eventually leading to recentralization.127   
This tension between localities and the central government 
demonstrates the importance of cooperation between officials when 
attempting decentralization, as both have the capacity to hinder the new 
policy.128  FIP, with its local authorization, will face a similar struggle 
because it is a new form of foreign direct investment and an unprecedented 
shift toward decentralization.   
The FIP also faces a much more fractured policymaking environment 
in comparison to the one in which the government refined EJV and WFOE 
laws to make them more attractive to foreign investors.  Numerous interest 
groups with significant sway have created a contentious atmosphere and are 
forcing the government to balance conflicting goals.129  Policymaking is 
much more difficult without central authority over the drafting of 
legislation.130  Still, China’s economic control of the planning system has 
largely been abandoned.131  Implementation of detailed implementing 
regulations for FIP is thus more difficult now than it has been for past 
foreign investment vehicles such as EJV and WFOE. 
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B. The Chinese Government Is Unlikely to Support FIP Because of 
Lingering Suspicions of Private Enterprise and Partnerships  
 
The 2010 authorization of FIP enterprises is an additional step that 
was built on previous decisions concerning partnerships generally.  This 
history will likely have a substantial negative impact on the continued 
development of the legal and regulatory framework of FIPs.  
As indicated by the feudal partnership of Guan and Bao, partnerships 
were common in China prior to the 1949 revolution.132  However, China’s 
emphasis on socialist centralization of the economy and complete 
government control following the Communist Party’s takeover meant that 
partnerships mostly disappeared at the end of the 1950s until the 1980s.133   
The communist government’s shunning of partnerships continued to 
prevail after China emerged from political and economic isolation and began 
liberalizing its economy in 1979.  Many business organizations with 
elements of partnerships were legalized, yet they were based in existing 
economic regulations and the label of “partnership” was intentionally 
avoided so as to not give an appearance of capitalism or privatization.134  
Accordingly, an entire generation of Chinese technocrats views capitalism 
and privatization with suspicion.135   
This suspicion manifested in the refusal of China’s leaders to approve 
partnerships within until 1997.136  Even then, the 1997 authorization was 
only for general partnerships, in which partners have unlimited joint and 
several liability.137  This led to the initial partnership authorization receiving 
limited attention.138  Yet, it was not until 2007 that limited liability 
partnerships were authorized.139  This finally allowed limited partners to be 
liable exclusively for debts to the extent of their capital contribution, similar 
to an EJV.140   
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China’s strained history with the partnership enterprise is likely to 
detrimentally influence further development of FIPs.  It is probable that of 
the three existing foreign investment enterprises, FIPs will most closely 
resemble CJVs, which has fallen into relative disuse because of the 
restrictions placed on it by the Chinese government.141 
C. The 2012 Political Transition Decreases the Probability That FIP 
Will Be Further Developed in the Short Term 
The current transfer of political leadership from President Hu Jintao, 
to Vice President Xi Jinping142 may also significantly impede the 
development of detailed FIP regulations or government support for FIPs.  
Changes in China’s leadership, no matter how subtle, make a substantial 
difference because of the divergent developmental strategies and policies 
preferred by each politician.143  The impending change of leadership has 
already exposed disagreement between Chinese leaders over economic 
priorities, including the role of investment in the domestic economy.144   
A similar transfer of political power at the top of the Communist Party 
in the 1980s, was a leading factor in the Chinese government’s inability to 
secure investment in energy-related fields.145  The next generation of 
politicians in China is likely to “bring fresh ideas, insights, and a rich range 
of experience to the pinnacle of China’s governance.”146  It is unclear 
whether FIP, promulgated by outgoing leaders, will be given the attention 
necessary to succeed as an investment vehicle. 
A natural response to this critique is to acknowledge that China has 
progressed beyond such uncertainty in its past.  After all, since China’s 
opening to the outside world, several thousand pieces of legislation on 
foreign-related trade and investment in China were promulgated and 
implemented,147 suggesting a more stable environment.   
But predictable economic development is anything but certain.  Even 
with this existing body of regulations, it would be a mistake to assume that 
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foreign investments, especially in an entirely new platform like FIP, will be 
developed with the degree of consistency that is expected of other global 
economy-influencing countries.  As The Economist notes in describing 
China: 
Too many Westerners . . . assume they are dealing with a self-
confident, rational power that has come of age.  Think instead 
of a paranoid, introspective imperial court, already struggling 
with subjects and now embarking on a slightly awkward 
succession.148    
This characterization, while meant for a decidedly western audience, 
finds support in atypical decisions made by the Chinese government.  For 
example, the ongoing political transition influenced China’s decision to 
issue regulations that punish television programs that are too entertaining 
because of a perceived subversive effect.149  If China is nervous about 
television being too entertaining, it is hard to reliably predict how FIPs will 
be treated.  
The capacity for economic upheaval and reprioritization is likely 
burnished by the different political outlook of China’s incoming politicians, 
who are more open to political reform than outgoing leaders.150  Considering 
that FIP is likely to continue to struggle without sufficient regulatory 
specificity,151 it is unlikely that, during a period of remarkable political 
transition, FIP will be given the support and resources necessary to become a 
widely utilized foreign investment enterprise. 
V. THE FIP CAN STILL SUCCEED THROUGH PROMULGATION OF DETAILED 
REGULATIONS FOR EQUITY INVESTMENTS 
In order to become an effective foreign direct investment enterprise, 
several legal changes to FIP law are necessary.  Because implementing these 
changes will be difficult in China’s fractured policy making environment, 
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China should instead focus on developing FIP for private equity funds and 
investments, a smaller category of foreign direct investment.   
A. China Should Build a Comprehensive FIP Regulatory Regime For 
Private Equity Funds 
Implementing regulations for FIPs that will have equity investment as 
a main business are notably lacking.  FIP regulations themselves simply note 
that “[w]here a foreign-invested partnership, the main business of which is 
investment, makes an investment in China, matters shall be handled in 
accordance with relevant state laws, administrative regulations, and rule on 
foreign investment.”152  This reliance on existing laws is unfortunate, as 
foreign investors hoped that FIP laws would finally open this nascent area to 
foreign direct investment.153  FIPs in this sector would attract both local and 
foreign investors, enjoy tax-transparency, and be able to make investments 
at will, without having to go through foreign authorities.154  
The only possible pre-existing state law on this subject is the 
Administration of Foreign-Invested Venture Capital Enterprise 
Provisions.155  These administrative provisions, promulgated in 2003, 
predate not only FIP law (by nearly a decade), but also law authorizing 
domestic limited Chinese partnerships.156  It is difficult to apply these rules 
to the newer FIP as they often conflict with more recent laws.  For example, 
under the 2003 rules, any investment or Venture Capital FIP requires 
approval from multiple central authorities–directly at odds with FIP 
regulations.157  The Enterprise Provisions also prohibit numerous practices 
favored by foreign investors, such as borrowing to make investments, high 
capital contribution requirements (again, contravening the subsequent FIP 
regulations), and structuring limitations that increase tax burdens for foreign 
investors.158  These contradictions will continue to deter investors from 
utilizing FIPs for equity investments.  
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Yet even with these obstacles, foreign investors have increasingly 
utilized FIPs for private equity investments.159  This would seem to indicate 
strong demand from foreign investors for the ability to use FIPs for equity 
investment.  By channeling that demand into detailed regulations for this 
specific category of foreign direct investment, China could provide a 
limited, yet robust, sector for FIPs.   
 China should amend FIP regulations in order to provide the clarity 
necessary for equity-investment FIPs to flourish.  A transitioning Chinese 
government could limit the promulgation of regulatory detail to this specific 
category of foreign direct investment, preventing the type of change that 
would impact other foreign investment enterprises and potentially disrupt 
existing foreign direct investment regulations and investments.  
China should accomplish this by first indicating that it will make the 
necessary adjustments to ensure that FIPs are a viable platform for equity 
investment.  Practitioners are hopeful that the Chinese government will take 
an important step by issuing detailed regulations on how an FIP can convert 
its capital into Chinese currency for equity investment.160  The absence of a 
clear mechanism for conversion of FIP capital into Chinese currency limits 
the ability of FIPs to serve as an equity investment vehicle.161  This initial 
step could either be accompanied or followed by detailed regulations that 
allow foreign investors to utilize FIPs for equity investments.  Other 
necessary regulations include detail regarding the tax treatment of individual 
partners, the tax treatment of various enterprise incomes, the availability of 
tax benefits for certain favored industries, and taxes on company FIP 
partners.162   
This limited development of regulatory specificity for implementation 
would provide a viable investment platform for foreign investors while 
limiting the institutional support necessary from central and local 
governments–equity investment could function as an incubator for FIPs.  
Limiting detailed implementing regulations to these investment-minded 
FIPs, would prevent an upset of the delicate balance between other foreign 
investment enterprises for foreign investors, who would not have the option 
of taking more traditional investments and categorizing them as investment 
funds.  Finally, China could also maintain centralized control for this 
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particular FIP, as it does in the 2003 Venture Capital Rules, which is critical 
to achieving the aforementioned prerequisites to effective policy formation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While China has made a remarkable amount of progress in opening 
the country to foreign direct investment and creating a legal system 
amenable to foreign entities, there is still progress to be made.  FIPs 
represent an important, if ultimately uncertain step towards allowing and 
encouraging foreign direct investment in China.  However, broader use of 
FIP by foreign investors will hinge on two factors, as evidenced by the 
experience of other foreign direct investment vehicles.  These two factors 
are detailed implementing regulations and government support.  
Detailed implementing regulations and government support for FIP 
are both questionable.  Implementing regulations are unlikely because of 
provisions in FIPs that conflict with the policymaking process in China.  
Government support is unlikely because of continued suspicion of the 
partnership entity and an ongoing political transition.  Until exacting 
regulations are promulgated and established, foreign investment through 
FIPs will likely be tepid.   
Issuance of detailed implementing regulations for FIP equity 
investments would help achieve China’s stated interest in reversing 
downward foreign direct investment trends.  Doing so would preserve the 
status quo of other investment enterprises while allowing the creation of a 
viable platform for foreign investors that can be later expanded into other 
categories more broadly, encouraging the formation of many Guan and Bao 
partnerships between foreign and Chinese investors.  
 
